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STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On December Yd, 2012 Plaintiff filed a new complaint even though the complaint was
signed Four (4) weeks earlier (November 5t\ 2012) and was issued a summons. On January 24th,
2013 my son was handed a summons and complaint and was not on the property located at 1681
Ruby Creek Road at the time of delivery. In good faith, on the 8th of February, 2013, I filed a
Notice of Special Appearance in accord with IRCP Rule 4(i)(2). By the 2l5t of February, 2013,
still no Affidavit of Service was filed with the Court, I filed the Motion to Dismiss contesting
Service. Attached with the Motion to Dismiss was a Memorandum in Support and Three (3)
Affidavits in Support. A hearing date was scheduled for May 7th, 2013, on the Motion to Dismiss.
Also discovery was sent to Plaintiff to figure out whether or not they had standing. Respondent
finally files on the 25 th of February, 2013 an untrue Affidavit of Service stating that my son is a
co-resident of 1681 Ruby Creek Road in an attempt to cover up his failure to properly serve the
Appellant in accord with IRCP Rule 4(d)(2). On March 15 th , 2013, I received a Response to my
Discovery, which showed that Plaintiff did not have standing to sue on behalf of Chase Bank
USA. I was too sick to appear and notified the Court on May 3rd , 2013, to table the Motion.
Because service was not accomplished by June yct, 2013 as required by IRCP Rule 4(a)
(2), the Motion to Dismiss was not noticed up for hearing by the Appellant. The Court failed to
dismiss the case sua sponte. Since February of 2013, Respondent could have attempted to serve
me, but chose not to. As of June 41\ 2013, no service was made and there was no jurisdiction for
the Court to act further. Also the case lacked activity for the continue to have jurisdiction. There
was no notification of that either in accord with IRCP Rule 40(c).
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Because there was no jurisdiction for the Court to act, I chose to not participate and stand
ground on the issue that Service was not done. I am also asserting now, that the Respondent has
no standing to bring the action and that the Court is also barred from determining the initial
complaint due to principles of illegality of contract being unenforceable by the court.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The Appellant requests that the Court review the record to see if there was proper service
on the Appellant in accord with IRCP Rule 4(d)(l) & (2). The Appellant requests that the Court
review the record to see if service was done in accord IRCP Rule 4(a)(2). The Appellant requests
that the Court review the record to see if the Court lost jurisdiction due to improper service,
improper complaint, failure to dismiss complaint for IRCP Rule 4(a)(2) violations, illegality of
contract issues surrounding Respondent and/or the trial court, standing issues surrounding
Respondent and/or the trial court pursuant to IRCP Rule 17(a), did Judges Mitchell and Yerby
have proper authority to preside on this case in any capacity when the case was assigned to Judge
Buchanan, and if not does any determinations, rulings, orders, judgments made by them void or
voidable for lack of jurisdiction, whether there is a violation of due process and equal protection
standards in both the State and National constitutions due to trial court error.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Appellant claims attorney fees pursuant to I.A.R Rule 40 in conjunction with chapter 1 of
Title 12, more specifically described as I.C. § 12-114.
Additionally, Appellant claims Attorney Fees pursuant to I.A.R. 4l(d) which states in part
to wit:
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The claim for attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court may include
paralegal fees shall be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the method of
computation of the attorney fees claimed.
For a great part of this case the Appellant has secured the assistance of a
paralegal/specialized legal assistant to do most of his writing, research, and preparation of oral
arguments before the court. Appellant asserts that should he prevail on Appeal he should be able
to get attorney fees for his services as provided by the paralegal/specialized legal assistant.

ARGUMENT
I. Application of Court Rules

A. Authority
Generally speaking when discussing due process of law as it applies to the mechanics of
the courts of this State, due process refers to substantive rule making and procedural rule making.
Substantive rule making is the creation of courts and its jurisdiction which is exclusively reserved
to the Legislative Department. Procedural rule making can be done by either the Legislative or
Judicial Department, unless the subject matter is strictly reserved to the Legislative Department,
as seen in Constitution of the State of Idaho in Article V, Sections 2, 9 and 13 which states to wit:
Section 2. Judicial power -- Where vested. The judicial power of the state shall be
vested in a court for the trial of impeachments, a Supreme Court, district courts,
and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as established by the
legislature. The courts shall constitute a unified and integrated judicial system for
administration and supervision by the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of such
inferior courts shall be as prescribed by the legislature. Until provided by law, no
changes shall be made in the jurisdiction or in the manner of the selection of
judges of existing inferior courts. [Emphasis Added]
Section 9. Original and appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court shall have jurisdiction to review, upon appeal, any decision of the district
courts, or the judges thereof, any order of the public utilities commission, any
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order of the industrial accident board, and any plan proposed by the commission
for reapportionment created pursuant to section 2, article III; the legislature may
provide conditions of appeal, scope of appeal, and procedure on appeal from
orders of the public utilities commission and of the industrial accident board.
On appeal from orders of the industrial accident board the court shall be limited
to a review of questions of law. The Supreme Court shall also have original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas
corpus, and all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. [Emphasis Added]
Section 13. Power of legislature respecting courts. The legislature shall have no
power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which
rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government; but the
legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law,.
when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of
all the courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done
without conflict with this Constitution, provided, however, that the legislature
can provide mandatory minimum sentences for any crimes, and any sentence
imposed shall be not less than the mandatory minimum sentence so provided. Any
mandatory minimum sentence so imposed shall not be reduced. [Emphasis Added]
No matter whether a rule of procedure is created by the Legislative or Judicial
Departments, it is required by the Constitution of the State of Idaho that such rules must be
general and uniform throughout the State. This sentiment is expressed in Article V, Section 26 of
the Constitution of the State ofldaho, which states to wit:
Section 26. Court procedure to be general and uniform. All laws relating to courts
shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the state, and the organized
judicial powers, proceedings, and practices of all the courts of the same class or
grade, so far as regulated by law, and the force and effect of the proceedings,
judgments, and decrees of such courts, severally, shall be uniform.
This requirement is necessary to ensure that due process and equal protection of the law
standards are guaranteed to everybody in the State and is expressed in Article I, Declaration of
Rights in Sections 1, 2, 13, 18, and 21. Also, the State is mandated to guarantee everybody in this
State the Rights as contained in the Bill of Rights in Amendment to the Constitution of the
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United States of America.
Before the State of Idaho was a State of the Union and was called the Territory of Idaho ,
the federal government handled all substantive and procedural issues through legislation. So the
laws on court procedures where codified in the Territorial Laws of the Territory of Idaho. When
the Territory of Idaho was accepted as a State and became the State of Idaho, the Courts of the
State had the power to create procedural law in the furtherance of the Court. This was recognized
by the Legislature with the following excerpts from two cases to wit:
"Our legislature has recognized and confirmed the procedural rule-making power
of the Supreme Court. LC.§§ 1-212, 1-213 .... This occurred in 1941.
LC.§ 1-212 provides:
Rule-making power recognized.
The inherent power of the Supreme
Court to make rules governing procedure in all the courts of Idaho is
hereby recognized and confirmed.
LC. § 1-213 provides:
Limitation.
The Supreme Court shall prescribe,
Duty to make rules
by general rules, for all the courts of Idaho, the forms of process, writs,
pleadings and motions, the manner of service, time for appearance, and the
practice and procedure in all actions and proceedings. Said rules shall
neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant."

cf State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 700 P.2d 942 at 943-44 (1985); R.E. W Construction Inc.
v. District Court of Third Judicial District, 88 Idaho 426, 400 P.2d 390 (1965). many of the
procedures dealing with the Court as stated in the laws for the Territory of Idaho, which was retitled as the laws of the State of Idaho were supplanted with Court Rules adopted by the Supreme
Court of the State of Idaho. On or about 1975, the Supreme Court adopted most of the series of
Federal Court Rules, inclusive of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).
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After several amendments to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, we have today these
rules for service of process on individuals starts in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(l) which
details the use of the summons and begins the mandatory instructions on how personal service is
to be accomplished, to wit:

"A copy of the complaint shall be served with the summons, except when the
service is by publication as provided in Rule 4(e). The plaintiff shall furnish the
person making service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made
as follows: [Emphasis Added] I.R.C.P. Rule 4( d)(l)
"Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2) details the requirements for personal service upon
individuals as follows:
Upon an individual other than those specified in subdivision (3) of this rule, by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual
personally or by leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house or usual
place of abode with some person over the age of eighteen (18) years then residing
therein or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process."
cf 1 Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 78 P.3d 379 (2003).

This appeal is primarily a question of whether there is sufficient service of process.
B. Liberal Construction of the Court Rules and Service of Process Rules.

In the last sentence of Rule 1(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states, "These rules
shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding." I know of no case which defines what exactly the terms "liberally
construed" means, but the terms "liberal construction" has been decided to include these
parameters in the case of Bunn v. Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 587 P.2d 1245 (1978) in which the Court
1 cf means "cited from."
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stated,
"The 'liberal construction' of the rules required by Rule 1, while it cannot alter
compliance which is mandatory and jurisdictional, will ordinarily preclude
dismissal of an appeal for that which is but technical noncompliance." c.f Bunn v.
Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 587 P.2d 1245 (1978).
Due to the nature of the question of service, and service being both mandatory and jurisdictional
in nature, liberal construction of what Rule 4(d) states cannot be liberally construed, but must be
strictly construed. I started with the language in Rule 4(d)(l) because it states that "Service shall
be done as follows." "The manner in which the summons and original complaint in a civil action
are to be served is specified in Rule 4(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." c.f Rudd v.

Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 66 P.3d 230 (2003). Even though the word "shall" has been decided by
the courts to mean in statute to be "mandatory", "The word shall, when used in a statute, is
mandatory. Munroe v. Sullivan Mining Co., 69 Idaho 348, 207 P.2d 54 7 (1949); Pierce v.
Vialpando, 78 Idaho 274,301 P.2d 1099 (1956)." c.f Paolini v. Albertson's Inc, 143 Idaho 547,
149 P.3d 822 (2006); Gilbert v. Moore, 108 Idaho 165, 697 P.2d 1179 (1985); Goffv. HJH Co.,
95 Idaho 837, 521 P.2d 661 (1974), "This Court has held on many occasions that the word 'shall'
denotes a mandatory, not a discretionary act." See Madison v. JI Morgan, Inc., 115 Idaho 141,
144, 765 P.2d 652,655 (1988). When the term "shall" was used in Rules ll(b)(3) and 54(e)(3)
This Court determined that the word "shall" denoted mandatory act(s). "The rule, employing the
term "shall," is mandatory-it requires the court to consider all eleven factors plus any other
factor the court deems appropriate." c.f Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 111 P.3d 110
(2005). I am of the opinion that "There are rules, and, particularly, 'shall' rules I think have to be
complied with, and courts themselves are places where rules are followed." c.f Sammis v.
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Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 941 P.2d 314 (1997). Rules 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(2) are part of the
"shall" rules, which requires mandatory acts to be in accordance with these expressed Court
Rules.
II. Service of Process on Individuals Requirements

Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(d)(2) there are three methods for
service on an individual. They are: 1) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to
the individual personally; 2) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint by
leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode with some
person over the age of eighteen (18) years then residing therein; [Emphasis Added] and lastly 3)
by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive service of process. "Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2) provides that
service upon an individual is proper if the summons and complaint are delivered to the individual
personally or left at their residence with an authorized person, or by delivering a copy of the
summons and complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process." c.f Sivak v. Idaho Department of Corrections, Docket No. 39013, 2012 Unpublished
Opinion No. 522. (2012).
It is not in dispute that the Appellant was not personally served. In other words the

summons and complaint was never placed into the hands of the Appellant by the process server
employed by the Respondent. And I do not believe that it is in dispute that summons and
complaint was never placed into the hands of an agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process. So, the issue of whether service of process was accomplished in
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accord with option 2 in IRCP Rule 4(d)(2) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the
complaint by leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode
with some person over the age of eighteen ( 18) years then residing therein; [Emphasis Added] is
contested by Appellant and most likely by Respondent.

III. Time Line, It's Importance and Errors Committed.
As mentioned in the Statement of Facts the time line from the initial filing of the
complaint until a few days before trial is important to go over again, this time in detail. Using the
ROA, R Vol. I, pages 9 - 10, and is incorporated herein by its reference.
On December 3rct, 2012 Plaintiff filed a new complaint even though the complaint was
signed Four (4) weeks earlier (November 51\ 2012) and was issued a summons. The case was
assigned to District Court Judge Steven Verby. ROA, R Vol. I, page 9. Respondent had Six (6)
months to serve the summons and complaint on the Appellant in accord with IRCP Rule 4(a)(2)
which is jurisdictional and mandatory. IRCP Rule 4(a)(2) states to wit:
(2) Time Limit for Service. If a service of the summons and complaint is not
made upon a defendant within six (6) months after the filing of the complaint and
the party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why
such service was not made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to
that defendant without prejudice upon the court's own initiative with 14 days
notice to such party or upon motion. IRCP Rule 4(a)(2)
Mandatory compliance with IRCP Rule 4(a)(2) for service of the summons and complaint ended
on June 3rd, 2013 or the Court is under mandate to dismiss the case pursuant to IRCP Rule 4(a)
(2). This is not a discretionary act. "As a matter of policy, any jurisdictional consequence of a
rule should be plainly expressed in the rule itself. Loss of jurisdiction should not be a subtle
creature of inference, lurking as a threat to the unwary." c.f Wardv. Lupinacci, 111 Idaho 40, 41,
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720 P.2d 223, 224 (Ct.App. 1986). "'There are rules, and, particularly, 'shall' rules I think have to
be complied with, and courts themselves are places where rules are followed.' Rule 4(a)(2) is
couched in mandatory language, requiring dismissal where a party does not comply, absent a
showing of good cause. c.f Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 941 P.2d 314 (1997).
On January 24t\ 2013 my son was handed a summons and complaint and was not on the
property located at 1681 Ruby Creek Road at the time of delivery. IRCP Rule 4(i)(2) states to
wit:
(2) Motion or Special Appearance to Contest Personal Jurisdiction. A motion
under Rule 12(b)(2), (4) or (5), whether raised before or after judgment, a motion
under Rule 40(d)(l) or (2), or a motion for an extension of time to answer or
otherwise appear does not constitute a voluntary appearance by the party under
this rule. The joinder of other defenses in a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4) or (5)
does not constitute a voluntary appearance by the party under this rule. After a
party files a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4) or (5), action taken by that party in
responding to discovery or to a motion filed by another party does not constitute a
voluntary appearance. If, after a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is denied,
the party pleads further and defends the action, such further appearance and
defense of the action will not constitute a voluntary appearance under this rule.
The filing of a document entitled "special appearance" which does not seek any
relief but merely provides notice that the party is entering a special appearance to
contest personal jurisdiction, does not constitute a voluntary appearance by the
party under this rule if the party files a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5)
within fourteen (14) days after filing such document, or within such later time as
the court permits. IRCP Rule 4(i)(2) and is incorporated herein by its reference.
By the 8th of February, 2013, I filed a Notice of Special Appearance in accord with IRCP
Rule 4(i)(2) which automatically gave me 14 more days to file a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to
IRCP Rule 12(b)(2),(4), & (5). See IRCP Rule 4(i)(2) and ROA, R Vol. I, page 9. Pursuant to
IRCP Rule 4(i)(2) no general appearance was made.
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Judge Yerby quit2 as District Court Judge to supposedly head for retirement and was
replaced with newly appointed District Court Judge Barbara Buchanan as noted in the ROA as a
"(batch process)" on February 181, 2013. Also Two (2) weeks had gone by and no Affidavit of
Service was filed with the Court.
By the 21 st of February, 2013, still no Affidavit of Service was filed with the Court, I filed
the Motion to Dismiss contesting Service, R. Vol. I, pages 18-20, attached with a Memorandum
in Support, R. Vol. I, pages 21-23, and Three (3) Affidavits in Support. See R. Vol I, pages 24-29
and are incorporated herein by its reference. A hearing date was scheduled for May 7th , 2013.
Also discovery was sent to Plaintiff to figure out whether or not they had standing. Still there is
no general appearance on my part to constitute a waiver in accord with IRCP Rule 4(i)(2). In the
affidavits that I filed, the affiants all testified that my son does NOT reside at 1681 Ruby Creek
Road, since 2011, which is still true today. The affiants all testified that my son does NOT act as
our (my husband and myself) agent to accept service of process.
After these facts that my son does NOT reside at 1681 Ruby Creek Road and my son does
NOT act as our (my husband and myself) agent to accept service of process was established on
the case record - R. Vol I, pages 24-29, the Respondent finally files on the 25 th of February, 2013
an untrue Affidavit of Service stating that my son is a co-resident of 1681 Ruby Creek Road in an
attempt to cover up his failure to properly serve the Appellant in accord with IRCP Rule 4(d)(2).

2 This is important, because I would have automatically disqualified him due to his poor reputation. Him suddenly
quitting his post I thought he must have been accused of something, like his predecessor. Also, it was common
knowledge that he had a high rate of automatic disqualifications or self imposed disqualifications, which left me
with the feeling he was either incompetent or didn't perform well to the ends of proper justice or both.
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On March 15 1\ 2013, I received a Response to my Discovery, which showed that Plaintiff
did not have standing to sue on behalf of Chase Bank USA, nor were they assignees of Chase
Bank USA, and nor were they third party beneficiaries as part of any alleged the contract entered
in the State of Idaho between Chase Bank USA and I, nor was there ANY agreement entered in
the State of Idaho between Chase Bank USA and I to have my financial information disclosed to
any third party(ies).
Art. I, § 18 of the Idaho Constitution .... provides:
"Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded
for every injury of person, property or character, and rights and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial, delay or prejudice."

c.f Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976). It is hardly effective for
a Court to be open to every person, if only attorneys get heard and the judge on the bench falls
asleep when the individual appearing in propria persona speaks to the Court for relief or to
defend himself/herself. In the First Judicial District the appearance of this disrespect is more than
an appearance it is actually occurring. In this case the disrespect was shown in the application of
IRCP Rule 7(b)(4) wherein location of the parties was used to deny telephonic appearances even
though location of the parties is not discussed in the rule. This impartiality to due process cannot
be met if being heard is not done in a meaningful manner via equal access to a telephonic hearing
under IRCP Rule 7(b )(4). I am tried of being abused by the court that is unjust in the application
of its rules, which favors attorneys over in propria persona litigants. This is especial true when
the Court expects in propria persona litigants to follow the rules of court as if we are trained
attorneys. As in propria persona litigants we expect to receive the same benefits or relief from
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the rules of court as does an attorney receive. I think that is not unreasonable to request. As a
result by the conduct of the presiding judge, I was not afforded the same opportunity as was
given to the attorney for the Respondent, and I was prejudiced as a result, due to my illness.

"Procedural due process "basically requires that a person, whose protected rights are
being adjudicated, is afforded an opportunity to be heard in a timely manner." Powers v. Canyon
County. 108 Idaho 967, 969, 703 P.2d 1342, 1344 (1985). There must be notice and the

opportunity to be heard must "occur at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.... "
Cowan v. Bd. o(Comm'rs, 143 Idaho 501,512, 148 P.3d 1247, 1258 (2006) (quotingAberdeenSpringfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91,982 P.2d 917,926 (1999)) (internal quotations

omitted)." c.f Ada County Highway District v. Total Success Investments, LLC., 145 Idaho 360,
179 P.3d 323 (2008).

In April of 2013, I established a double standard and prejudice of Judge Buchanan. When
an attorney requests to be heard telephonically it is granted, but when someone is appearing in
propria persona and does not have an attorney at their side the same request is denied. R. Vol I,
pages 36-38 and 45-48, respectfully. Also, the Respondent removed my husband from the case
and amended the caption, R. Vol I, pages 41-43, due to their thinking that service was done and
they no longer needed him for service issues. I was too sick to appear and notified the Court on
May 3r\ 2013, to table the Motion. R. Vol I, pages 51-52. Still there is no general appearance on
my part to constitute a waiver in accord with IRCP Rule 4(i)(2).
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Also this series of events showed me that Judge Buchanan was not impartial and was
biased and prejudiced against the Appellant.
Service was not accomplished by June 3rd , 2013 as required by IRCP Rule 4(a)(2) and the
Court failed to dismiss the case either. Since February of 2013, Respondent could have attempted
to serve me, but chose not to. As of June 41\ 2013, no service was made and there was no
jurisdiction for the Court to act further.
"'If a party wishes to insist upon the objection that he is not in court, he must keep out for

all purposes except to make that objection.' Pingree Cattle Loan Co. v. Charles J Webb & Co.,
36 Idaho 442, 446, 211 P. 556, 557 (1922) (quoting from Lowe v. Stringham, 14 Wis. 222
(1861) ).... Rule 4(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure mitigates to some extent the rule that
the party must keep out for all purposes except to object that he is not in court." c.f Rhino
Metals, Inc., v. Craft, 146 Idaho 319, 193 P.3d 866 (2008). After June Yd, 2013, I did not

participate, except to notify the Court of that fact.
"The service of the summons confers the court with personal jurisdiction over a party.
Engleman v. Milanez, 137 Idaho 83, 84, 44 P.3d 1138, 1139 (2002).

"Personal jurisdiction refers to the court's authority to adjudicate the claim as to
the person. That a court has "jurisdiction of a party" means either that a party has
appeared generally and submitted to the jurisdiction, has otherwise waived
service of process, or that process has properly issued and been served on such
party." c.f State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 91 P.3d 1127 (2004)
"Generally, where a party has not been served with process or was improperly
served with process, any judgment against such party is void. Wells v. Valley Natl.
Bank o(Arizona, 109 Ariz. 345, 509 P.2d 615 (1973). As we noted in Garren v..
Rollins, 85 Idaho 86, 375 P.2d 994 (1962):
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Under the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States, a personal
judgment rendered without service of process on, or legal notice to, a defendant,
in the absence of a voluntary appearance or waiver is void, and not merely
voidable.
Thiel v. Stradley, 118 Idaho 86, 87, 794 P.2d 1142, 1143 (1990). Thus, a judgment taken in an
action where service of process was not made, or improperly made, is void ... " cf Lohman v.
Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 78 P.3d 379 (2003).
There being neither lawful service of process upon nor a voluntary appearance before the
court by any of the defendants, the district court was wholly without jurisdiction of the
defendants. See Garren v. Rollins, 85 Idaho 86,375 P.2d 994 (1962).
"Additionally, a judgment is void when a court's action amounts to a plain usurpation of
power constituting a violation of due process. Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 644, 647, 991
P.2d 369, 372 (1998). The right to procedural due process guaranteed under both the Idaho and
United States Constitutions requires that a person involved in the judicial process be given
meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 133 Idaho at 648, 991 P.2d at 373."
cf McGloon v. Gwynn, 140 Idaho 727, 100 P.3d 621 (2004).
The January 22 nd , 2014 "status conference hearing", there no such animal in the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, this hearing was conducted not in Boundary County but in Bonner
County, before someone other than Judge Buchanan who was not appointed to be on the case in
violation of the public policy of this State and who decided the Motion to Dismiss wholly
without jurisdiction, without proper Notice. From the looks of the Transcript the hearing was
conducted telephonically from the Kootenai County Courthouse, before Judge John Mitchell who
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was not assigned to this case by way of court order and was an interloper on the case which had
no jurisdiction for its existence.
"Procedural law is governed by state practice." cf Stobie v. Potlach Forrests, Inc., 95
Idaho 666, 518 P 2d 1 (1973). There is no practice in the Court Rules for constant switching out

assigned judges for somebody else. IRCP Rule 1(c) makes it clear that the judges and magistrates
cannot make up rules as they go. IRCP Rule states to wit in part: "No district court or magistrates
division of the state shall make rules of procedure except as expressly authorized by these rules"
The only person who can stop this nonsense is the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho by
enforcing its rules and creating new ones to restrict judges from this type of ulta vires behavior.
Keeping in mind that Judge Mitchell who is also not assigned to this case through Court
order, unlawfully and in excess of his jurisdiction conducted the "status conference hearing" not
recognized in the IRCP and in violation of IRCP Rule 1(c).
Then, Judge Verby who had been taken off this case and was replaced with Judge
Buchanan, was acting wholly without jurisdiction by his actions to interfere with this case by
ruling on my Motion to Dismiss from Bonner County. Not even the ROA properly shows what
had happened.
But it seems, by the what took place through this unlawful and unauthorized "status
conference" that emphasis was given and taken by the Judges Mitchell and Verby that somehow
using discovery procedures is considered a general appearance even though the rules and case
law would suggest otherwise.
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In the Court Rules the filing of discovery is not a pleading as outlined in IRCP Rule 7(a)
to constitute a general appearance under IRCP Rule 4(i)(2). Due process requires notice and no
notice is given in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure that using discovery methods is considered
to be a general appearance. Appellant has not made a general appearance in this case. Even
though Judge Verby's conduct is the tampering with the administration of justice, if he had read
his own case citations, this concept that discovery does not constitute a general appearance is
clearly stated in Roy v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 488, 127 Cal.App.4 th 377, at n9 (2005), a
case he cites in his illegitimate ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, wherein it states to wit: "If a
defendant does need to engage in discovery, he may do so without being deemed to have made a
general appearance. (See Harding v. Harding, (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 626, 636, 121 Cal/Rptr.2d
450.)" Clearly the Appellant has not made a general appearance in this case. As usual the merits
of the issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss for lack of proper service was not determined and of
course the mandatory dismissal under IRCP Rule 4(a)(2) was also not done, in error.
Unauthorized Judge Verby in his quest to interfere with the administration of justice did
conduct a hearing outside of the County in which the action was brought, who has no
authorization to be assigned to the above entitled case from the Supreme Court and
Administrative Judge for the 1st Judicial District, who conducted a foreign hearing not in accord
with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure called a "Status Conference", made arbitrary and
capricious determinations not in accord with the laws of this State and did deprive the Appellant
of due process of law and equal protection under the law in violation of Sections 13, 18 of Article
1 of the Constitution of the State ofldaho and the 6th and 14th Amendments of the Bill of Rights
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of the Constitution of the United States of America. Isn't that enough to reverse and dismiss this
case.
On January 27th, 2014, once again Judge Mitchell conducted a trial who was without
authority to preside over the case, as he was not assigned to the in which Judge Buchanan was.
Given that privilege. Judge Buchanan not being incapacitated in any way or suffering the way of
death (at least yet) or being disqualified with or without cause, there was no reason for an
unauthorized substitute not recognized in the Court Rules and in fact in violation of IRCP Rule
l(c). Due to this impediment the determinations and judgments entered as a result of Judge
Mitchell acting wholly without jurisdiction or justification is void ab initio.
"Under the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States, a personal
judgment rendered without service of process on, or legal notice to, a defendant, in the absence
of a voluntary appearance or waiver is void, and not merely voidable. McDonald v. Mabee, 243
U.S. 90, 37 S.Ct. 343, 344, 61 L.Ed. 608. A judgment cannot be based on void service of process.
Ennis v. Casey, 72 Idaho 181, 238 P.2d 435, 28 A.L.R.2d 952. Due process of law envisions
opportunity upon reasonable notice for a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. Yellowstone
Pipe Line Co. v. Drummond, 77 Idaho 36, 287 P.2d 288. A void judgment is a nullity, and no
rights can be based thereon; it can be set aside on motion or can be collaterally attacked at any
time. Miller v. Prout, 33 Idaho 709, 197 P. 1023. Jensen v. Gooch. 36 Idaho 457,211 P. 551. 30A
Am.Jur. 198, Judgments, § 45. For a valid execution to issue it must be supported by a valid
judgment. Apple v. Edwards, 123 Mont. 135, 211 P.2d 138; 33 C.J.S. Executions§ 8, p. 141." c.f
Garren v. Rollins, 85 Idaho 86,375 P.2d 994 (1962).
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IV. Standing.

"Courts have the power to inquire into their 0vvn jurisdiction; they are obligated to ensure
their own subject matter jurisdiction and must raise the issue sua sponte if necessary." In re City
of Shelly, 151 Idaho 289, 25 5 P.3d 1175 (2011 ); Laughy v. Idaho Department of Transp., 149

Idaho 867, 233 P.3d 1055 (2010). "A court has a sua sponte duty to ensure that it has subject
matter jurisdiction over a case." State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 244 P.3d 1244 (2010). "The a
court lacks jurisdiction to hear a case is a question of law, and maybe raised at any time." Dunlap
v. State, 146 Idaho 197, 192 P.3d 1021 (2008). "The question of jurisdiction is fundamental and

cannot be ignored; even if jurisdictional questions are not raised by the parties, the Supreme
Court must address them on its own initiative." State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 246 P.3d 979
(2011). "A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when brought to the
attention of the court and should be addressed prior to considering the merits of an appeal." State
v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 80 P.3d 1083 (2003). A real party in interest is jurisdictional as stated
in IRCP Rule l 7(a).

IRCP Rule 17(a) mandates that every action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest. Courts must hesitate before resolving the rights of those not parties to litigation. State v.
Doe, 148 Idaho 919,231 P.3d 1016 (2010) citing Singleton v. Wolf, 428 U.S. 106, 113, 96 S.Ct.

2868, 2873-74, 49 L.Ed.2d 826, 832-33 (1976). Where a Plaintiff does not have standing it
cannot be said that the case or controversy requirement has been satisfied. Martin v. Camas
County Ex Rel Rel. Bd. Com'rs. 150 Idaho 1243, 248 P.3d 1243 (2011). Without standing the

judiciary lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. Martin v. Camas County Ex Rel Rel. Bd. Com'rs. 150
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Idaho 1243, 248 P.3d 1243 (2011).
A real party in interest "is the person who will be entitled to the benefits of the action if
successful, one who is actually and substantially interested in the subject matter." Carrington v.
Crandall, 63 Idaho 651,658, 124 P.2d 914,917 (1942). See Carl H Christensen Family Trust v..
Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 870, 993 P.2d 1197, 1201(1999); State, Dep't of Law Enforcement v.
One I 990 Geo Metro, 126 Idaho 675, 680, 889 P.2d 109, 114 (Ct.App.1995).

It is common knowledge that only parties to a contract have standing to bring an action
for breach of contract. See IRCP Rule 17(a). The Justices of the Supreme Court for the State of
Idaho issued recently several decisions pertaining to who can bring an action for breach of
contract. In Noak v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 152 Idaho 305, 271 P.3d 703 (2012), rehearing
denied, the High Court held that "Only a party to a contract may assert a claim for breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." and in Baccus v. Ameripride Services Inc., 145 Idaho
346, 179 P.3d 309 (2008) the court held that "Contract obligations are imposed because of
conduct of the parties manifesting consent, and are owed only to the specific individuals named
in the contract." Back in 1984 the justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho in Wing v.
Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 272, 688 P.2d 1172, 1177 (1984), did hold that "'Party must look to

person with whom he is in direct contractual relationship for relief, in the event that his
expectations under contract are not met.' Citing Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 45, 539 P.2d 590,
597 (1975); Minidoka County v. Krieger, 88 Idaho 395, 399, P.2d 962 (1965); Coburn v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 86 Idaho 415,387 P.2d 598 (1963)."

Page 20 of 33

Other jurisdictions within the Pacific Reporter have jurisprudence on point as to who can
bring an action such as this one for breach of contract.
The justices of the Supreme Court State of Montana in the case of Thompson v. Lincoln
Nat. Life Ins. Co., 114 Mont. 521, 138 P.2d 951, the court held that "A contract binds no one but

parties thereto." And again in 1977 in the case of Gambles v. Perdue, 175 Mont. 112, 572 P.2d
1241 the court held that "Obligation of contracts is limited to contracting parties.
The justices of the Supreme Court for the State of New Mexico in Staley v. New, 56 N.M.
756, 250 P.2d 893 (2011), the court held that "Generally, one who is not a party to a contract
cannot maintain a suit upon it.
The justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming in Cates v. Daniels, 628 P.2d
862, the court held that "For one to be liable on a contract, he must be a party to the contract or
must have given agent written authority to sign the agreement on his behalf." And again, in Ultra
Resources, Inc. v. Hartman, 226 P.3d 889 (2010), the court held "A stranger to a contract lacks

standing to maintain an action upon it."
The justices of the Court of Appeals of the State of Colorado in East Meadows Co., LLC
v. Greeley Irr. Co., 66 P.3d 214 (2003), held that "The general rule is that one who is not a party

to a contract, and from whom no consideration moved, has no connection therewith; he can avail
himself of its terms neither as a cause of action nor a defense."
The justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona m Lofts at Fillmore
Condominium Ass'n v. Reliance Commercial Const., Inc., 218 Ariz 574, 190 P.3d 733 (2008),

held that "As a general rule only the parties and privies to a contract may enforce it."
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The justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma in Wells Fargo Bank, NA. v.
Heath, 280 P.3d 328, the court held that "Contracts are binding only upon those who are parties

thereto, and are enforceable only by the parties to a contract or those in privity with it."
As admitted by counsel for Respondent, Respondent is not the original creditor, nor are
they an assignee of Chase Bank USA, See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Discovery Request
for Admissions, Request No. 8, 14, 15 and is incorporated herein as Appendix "A". There is no
nexus between the Appellant and Respondent. See Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Discovery
Request for Admissions, Request No. 23, 24. Plaintiffs Denies Admission Request No. 25, but no
agreement was ever placed into the record at trial. Equally true there were no contracts between
Chase Bank USA and the Appellant placed into the Court record either establishing a nexus
between Chase Bank USA and the Appellant. Without the contracts between Chase Bank USA
and the Appellant, Plaintiff could not establish that they are third party beneficiaries. Respondent
has no evidentiary showing that they are entitled to any damages resulting from any alleged
contractual relationship between Chase Bank USA and the Appellant. Simply put Respondent has
no standing to sue on this issue of contract between Chase Bank USA and the Appellant.
Respondent does not have "privity" with Appellant or Chase Bank USA, alleged original
creditor. Person not in privity cannot sue on a contract. Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 688 P.2d
1172 (1984 ). Privity refers to those who exchange contractual promissory words or those to
whom promissory words are directed. Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 688 P.2d 1172 (1984). See
also Professional Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 234 Kan 742, 675 P.2d 887 (1965). I
have no privity with the Respondent or counsel for the Respondent.
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Furthermore, Respondent and the counsel for Respondent did not allege in the verified
complaint that they are third-party beneficiaries to the alleged agreement between Chase Bank
USA and the Appellant, and that such status as third-party beneficiary could only be established
by Respondent by showing that the contract was primarily entered into for his benefit. See
Parout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 183 P.3d 771 (2008). By absence of allegation in the complaint

that Respondent is a third-party beneficiary by way of a contract with Chase Bank USA and the
Appellant, indicates there was no intent expressed in any alleged contract with Chase Bank USA
and the Appellant for the Respondent to be or become a third-party beneficiary.
There is no assignment from Chase Bank USA to EGP Investments, Inc., to make this
case a chose in action claim. "'Assignment' is defined as "the transfer of rights or property."
Black's Law Dictionary 115 (7th ed.1999). American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, defines
"assignment" as:
... a transfer of property or some other right from one person (the 'assignor') to another (the
'assignee'), which confers a complete and present right in the subject matter to the assignee. An
assignment is a contract between the assignor and the assignee, and is interpreted or construed in
accordance to rules of contract construction. 351 *351 Ordinarily, the word 'assignment' is limited
in its application to a transfer of intangible rights, including contractual rights, choses in action,
and rights in or connected with property, as distinguished from transfer of the property itself.
According to the Restatement of Contracts, an assignment of a right is a manifestation of the
assignor's intention to transfer it by virtue of which the assignor's right to performance by the
obligor is extinguished in whole or in part and the assignee acquires a right to such performance.
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6 Arn.Jur.2d Assignment § 1 (1999).
To be effective, an assignment must be completed with a delivery, and the
delivery must confer a complete and present right on the transferee. The assignor
must not retain control over the property assigned, the authority to collect, or the
power to revoke.
6 Arn.Jur.2d Assignment § 132 (1999).
Idaho recognizes that choses in action are generally assignable. AfcCluskev v. Galland, 95
Idaho 472. 474-75, 511 P.2d 289, 291-92 (1973). An assignment may be done in such a way to be
construed as a complete sale of the claim. 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignment§ 147 (1999). However, an
assignment that is absolute in form can be shown to be for purposes of collection only. Id. In
order to determine the intent of the assignment, the Court looks to the contract between the
assignor and assignee. Id. An assignment of the chose in action transfers to the assignee and
divests the assignor of all control and right to the cause of action, and the assignee becomes the
real party in interest. McCluskey, 95 Idaho at 474, 511 P.2d at 291. Only the assignee may
prosecute an action on the chose in action. Id." c.f Purco Fleet Services, Inc., v. Idaho
Department of Finance, 140 Idaho 121, 90 P.3d 346 (2004)

However, EGP Investments, Inc. admits that what they believe they purchased was
"charge off' accounts. According to Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, page 193 the term
"charge off' means to wit:
"An accounting term for the elimination from assets of an item of corporeal

property or of an account receivable, because of loss of value rendering the
corporeal property worthless or the insolvency of the person indebted upon the
account rendering it uncollectible. Rubinkam v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 149."
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See also Jones v. Commissioner, 38 F.2d 550; Commissioner v. MacDonald, 102 F.2d 942, 945;
and Stephenson v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 348 citing Avery v. Commissioner 22 F.2d 6, 55 A.L.R.
1277. The way a "charge off' account works is that Chase Bank USA declares on their tax return
a loss on these accounts including the expenses for collection in which they receive a dollar-fordollar tax write off, eliminating any damages from the source, which is the contract. On top of
that Chase Bank USA also made a claim to FSDLIC Insurance who gave that amount again on an
insurance claim. So, Chase Bank USA at the very least doubles their "investment" which was
nothing because it was the Federal Reserve System that created the credit out of thin air. All
fraudulent and all illegal.
Oh, but it gets better. Chase Bank USA literally sells a list of accounts which is nothing
more than financial information of each cardholder to a third party information broker. In this
State, doing that act is a felony, under LC. § 18-3125 and§ 18-3126, commonly referred to as
"Identity Theft."
Nowhere in the credit card agreement does the cardholder contract to allow the card issuer
sell his/her financial information to a third party information broker. Remember there is no third
party beneficiary named in the contract. Most credit card agreements no longer have as part of
the agreement provisions for assigning the account in the event there is a default in the payment.
EGP Investments complaint is insufficient on its face, due to there not being attached a
contract to show a valid assignment, a legal purchase as a third party beneficiary, and without
Chase Bank USA not being named as a party the parties to the contract are not before the Court,
as was in the case of Capps v. FIA Card Services, 149 Idaho 737, 90 P.3d 346 (2010) and is
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incorporated herein by its reference.
"For example, suppose Busy Bee Grocery is owed $850.00 by Joe Debtor and
Christensen acquires an assignment of the debt. Christensen might in turn seek out some
individual to whom he can sell Joe Debtor's debt, and might convince Jane Doe to buy it. Instead,
Christensen approaches Joe Debtor and convinces Joe that his life will be better if he, Joe, buys
up the debt. The right to recover a debt is a chose in action, and no law prohibits dealing in the
business of buying and selling choses in action." c.f Western Acceptance Corporation v. Jim

Jones, 117 Idaho 399, 788 P.2d 214 (1990). Looking at this example we can replace Busy Bee
Grocery with Chase Bank USA, Joe Debtor with the Appellant and Jane Doe with EGP
Investments, Inc. We know that EGP Investments, Inc., cannot be Christensen because he has no
assignment of the debt. Seeing other Purchase Agreements I know that EGP Investments, Inc.,
purchased only the information to the account, which is a felony under Idaho Law of I.C. § 183125 and§ 18-3126 and that Chase Bank USA still owns the underlying security because they
charge off the account and made it worthless. If Chase Bank USA sold the account to EGP
Investments, LLC., then, they committed securities fraud, that is why they need Christensen. But
in this case Christensen is not in the case, so standing to sue does not exist on the record, it
cannot exist by your own example in Western Acceptance Corporation v. Jim Jones, 117 Idaho
399, 788 P.2d 214 (1990). See Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Discovery Request for
Admissions. What's worse is that by the trial court not dismissing the case out sua sponte, it has
aligned itself with illegal and unlawful activity in derogation of the Constitution of the State of
Idaho and the Constitution of the United States of America. You see, Jane Doe who is EGP
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Investments, LLC., is suing out a claim in which he has no interest in the underlying credit card
debt. His interest is in the information obtained to harass the Appellant, in which he paid a
stippen, probably less than $400.00, in which he is claiming his damage to be over $ 18,000.00.
Where is the equities in that? By the way, guess who can still sue for the $18,000, that's right,
Chase Bank USA. This is true because it is going on across this nation and is a judicial problem.
Just so the record is complete, I do not owe EGP Investments, LLC., the monies they paid for the
information either. The more important question here is: Is this appellate court going to stop the
extortion, securities fraud, and racketeering from continuing created by the trial court or is it too
also going to be enjoined in the lawlessness.
Please understand I am not saying that Chase Bank USA may not have a claim against the
Appellant. I'm saying that EGP Investments does not have a claim against the Appellant, when
there was no notice of assignment provided to the Appellant as required by law, no assignment
has been shown to exist connecting them with Chase, and no contract detailing the contractual
obligations has been shown to exist between Chase and the Appellant or EGP Investments and
the Appellant.
Due to the foregoing and the absence in the record to show that Respondent is in fact a
real party in interest entitled to the benefits of the contract, it was error for the Court to enter
judgment against the Appellant.
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V. Any Interest Obtained is From an Illegal Contract and is Unenforceable.

"Whether a contract is against public policy is a question of law for the court to determine
from all the facts and circumstances of each case. Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 283, 240
P.2d 833, 840 (1952). Public policy may be found and set forth in the statutes, judicial decisions
or the constitution. Id at 287, 240 P.2d at 842. An illegal contract is one that rests on illegal
consideration consisting of any act or forbearance which is contrary to law or public policy. 17A
AM.JUR.2D Contracts § 239; see Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 924 P.2d 607 (1996). A
contract prohibited by law is illegal and hence unenforceable. 1\1iller. 129 Idaho at 351, 924 P.2d
at 613.
Although not clearly argued below or addressed in either the magistrate's decision or the
district court, in Idaho a court may not only raise the issue of whether a contract is illegal sua
sponte, Nab v. Hills, 92 Idaho 877, 882, 452 P.2d 981, 986 (1969); Belt v. Belt. 106 Idaho 426,
430 n. 2, 679 P.2d 1144, 1148 n. 2 (Ct.App.1984), but it has a duty to raise the issue of illegality,
whether 702*702 pled or otherwise, at any stage in the litigation. Stearns. 72 Idaho at 290, 240
P.2d at 842. As the Court in Stearns explained:
A party to a contract, void as against public policy, cannot waive its illegality by
failure to specially plead the defense or otherwise, but whenever the same is made to
appear at any stage of the case, it becomes the duty of a court to refuse to enforce it;
again, a court of equity will not knowingly aid in the furtherance of an illegal
transaction; in harmony with this principle, it does not concern itself as to the manner
in which the illegality of a matter before it is brought to its attention.
Id (emphasis added) (citation omitted) ..... Illegal contracts are void . .Miller, 129 Idaho at 351,
924 P.2d at 613; see 17A AM JUR 2D Contracts § 304. A void contract cannot be enforced.
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lvfiller, 129 Idaho at 351. 924 P.2d at 613; Wheaton v. Ramsey, 92 Idaho 33,436 P.2d 248 (1968).

A party to an illegal contract cannot ask the Court to have his illegal objects carried out, as the
law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement, but leaves the parties where it finds them.
Ingle v. Perkins, 95 Idaho 416,510 P.2d 480 (1973); Whitney v. Continental Life & Accident Co.,

89 Idaho 96, 403 P.2d 573 (1965); Worf ton v. Davis. 73 Idaho 217, 249 P.2d 810 (1952); Hancock
v. Elkington, 67 Idaho 542, 186 P.2d 494 (1947)." c.f Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 944

P.2d 695 (1997).
In this case, the purchase of financial information without the consent of the card holder is
an illegal act in accordance with I.C. § 18-3125 and§ 18-3126 to which this Court is obligated to
and in fact has a duty not to enforce it or any judgment when no standing exists arising from the
illegality. "In fact this Court has a duty to raise the issue of illegality. Quiring v. Quiring, 130
Idaho 560, 944 P.2d 695 (1997); see also Trees v. Kersey. 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 765, 768
(2002)." c.f Barry v. Pacific West Coast Construction, Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 103 P.3d 440 (2004).
"The Court will not enforce an illegal contract. Quiring, 130 Idaho at 568, 944 P.2d at
703. Illegal contracts are void, and generally the Court will "leave the parties where it finds
them." Id.; Trees. 138 Idaho at 9, 56 P.3d at 771; Kunz v. Lobo Lodge. Inc .. 133 Idaho 608,611,
990 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct.App.1999). This Court has stated that, "the rationale for leaving the
parties where the law finds them is premised on the notion that both parties are equally at fault."
Trees, 138 Idaho at 9, 56 P.3d at 771. When the Court "leaves the parties where it finds them," it

denies recovery to either party. Morrison v. Young. 136 Idaho 316, 319, 32 P.3d 1116, 1119
(2001); Kunz, 133 Idaho at 612, 990 P.2d at 1223." c.f Barry v. Pacific West Coast Construction,
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Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 103 P.3d 440 (2004).

"Idaho has long disallowed judicial aid to either party to an illegal contract. McShane v..
Quillin, 47 Idaho 542, 547, 277 P. 554, 559 (1929) ("No principle in law ... is better settled than

that which, with certain exceptions, refuses redress to either party to an illegal contract."). An
illegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration consisting of any act or forbearance
which is contrary to law or public policy. Quiring v. Quiring. 130 Idaho 560, 566, 944 P.2d 695,
701 ( 1997). Generally, when the consideration for a contract explicitly violates a statute, the
contract is illegal and unenforceable. Barry v. Pac. W Const,:, Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 832, 103 P.3d
440, 445 (2004). In most cases, the court will leave the parties to an illegal contract as it finds
them. Id" c.f Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604,200 P.3d 1153 (2009)
VI. CONCLUSION

Respondent failed to not only properly serve the Appellant or her husband in Accord with
IRCP Rule 4(d)(l) and (2), but when given the opportunity to correct their error within the time
limitation of IRCP Rule 4(a)(2) for service of a summons and complaint, they failed to correct
the error serving the summons and complaint in accord with IRCP Rule 4(d)(l) and (2). By no
later than June 51\ 2013, the District Court lost all jurisdiction and was required to sua sponte
dismiss the case for lack of timely service which they failed to do so in accord with IRCP Rule
4(a)(2) and Article I, section 18 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho and the due process
clauses of the Constitution of the State of Idaho in Article I, Section 13 and the 14th Amendment
of the Bill of Rights Amending the Constitution of the United States of America.
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Besides having this jurisdictional defect to continue the case due to the failure of proper
service, the Court itself was playing its own set of games to impair the Appellant from having a
fair and impartial hearing. With the advent of Judge Steven Yerby resigning (quitting) his
commission as a district court judge in mid-stream, Magistrate Barbara Buchanan was promoted
to replace him as District Court Judge and was assigned to the case. There were no objections
filed by the parties. To the best of the Appellant's knowledge and belief Judge Buchanan does not
suffer from any condition which would disqualify her from presiding over this case she was
assigned to by the Court. The Court however, scheduled proceedings foreign to the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, sent out notices not in harmony with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
detailing multiple alternative judges, which is not allowed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
or the Justices of the Supreme Court of the State ofldaho or the Legislature of the State ofldaho.
These acts of ulta vires coupled with the Judges Yerby and Mitchell participation in this case
without being properly assigned to the case, are acts wholly without jurisdiction and all
determinations, rulings, judgments are null and void ab initio. As a result of the actions of the
Court, Judges Yerby and Mitchell, Appellant's rights under Article I, section 18 of the
Constitution of the State of Idaho and the due process clauses of the Constitution of the State of
Idaho in Article I, Section 13 and the 14th Amendment of the Bill of Rights Amending the
Constitution of the United States of America were violated, not to mention the that there is a
judgment against the Appellant damaging the Appellant which can only be looked upon as a
conspiracy to violate the civil rights of the Appellant.
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Lastly, the Respondent themselves know they have no standing to bring this action and
has committed a fraud upon the court. But I have no State Court to turn to because they are too
busy not providing a proper administration of justice under the Constitution of the State of Idaho
and being in accord with the laws of the State and Court Rules as adopted by the Supreme Court
of the State ofldaho.
IF Judge Buchanan would have permitted the Appellant to appear telephonically as
requested and in accord with IRCP Rule 7(b)(4), due process could have been reached with two
parties slugging it out between them. But the biases and prejudices of the Judges of the First
Judicial District and I imagine the judges throughout whole State seems to be more important to
the Judges to keep rather than their Oath of Office, Constitution of the State of Idaho and of the
United States of America, the laws of the State and the Court Rules adopted by the Supreme
Court of the State of Idaho. The Mission Statement of the Supreme Court is a facade and
NOBODY will have access to a court in this State for the proper administration of justice.
History always repeats itself especially to governments which no longer serve the people in the
manner it is suppose to, which seems to be the way of the Courts of this State.
The obvious should not be needed to say, but I'll say it anyway. This case needs to be
reversed, remanded back to the District Court with Orders to Vacate the Judgment and dismiss
the case on jurisdictional grounds. Appellant needs to be compensated for the reasonable costs
associated in defending this frivolous suit and reasonable costs on appeal.

The Appellant

requests the Court to issue all necessary Orders to reverse, remand, vacate judgments, award
costs to the Appellant and dismiss case with prejudice. The Appellant requests the Court to issue
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all necessary Orders to award to Appellant costs on appeal.
Dated this 12th day of August, 2014.

Lori Skinner, In Propria Persona
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 14th day of August, 2014, I caused to be served and delivered the
original and Six (6) true and correct copies of the Appellant's Brief on Appeal and One (1)
unbound, unstapled copy to the Supreme Court and Two (2) true and correct copies of the
Appellant's Brief on Appeal to each party; and Certificate of Service; by the method as indicated
below, and addressed to the following:

[ v('°U. S. Mail

Stacey L. Wallace and Sean Beck
Johnson Mark, LLC
3023 East Copper Point Drive, Suite 102
Meridian, near [83642]
State of Idaho

[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] FAX Tel:

[Uu.s. Mail

The Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
Post Office Box 83 720
Boise, near [83720-0101]
State of Idaho

[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] FAX Tel:

By:
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Appendix "A"

1
2

3
4
5
6

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

7

8
9

EGP INVESTMENTS, LLC, a
Washington Limited Liability Company,

NO. CV-2012-426

10

Plaintiff,
vs.

11
12
13
14

LORI SKINNER, individually, and the
marital community comprised of LORI
SKINNER and BRET E. SKINNER, wife
and husband,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION

15
16

TO:

LORI SKINNER, individually, and the marital community comprised of
LORI SKINNER and BRET E. SKINNER, wife and husband,

17

Comes Now Plaintiff, EGP Investments, LLC, by and through its attorney of
18
l9

record, Brad L.:}1/illiams, and pursuant to Civil Rule 33(a)(2), hereby submits its

Answers and Responses to Defendants' First Set ofRequests for Admission, as follows:

20
21
22
23
24
25
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONES TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST
fOR ADMISSION - I

BRAD L. WILLIAMS, P.S.
621 W Mallon A venue, Ste. 603
Spokane, WA 99201
(509) 456-5270

Requests for Admission
2
3

ADMISSI ON NO. 1: You have no signed contract or signed application for credit which
shows that the Defendant(s) applied for a credit with Chase Bank USA for alleged
account xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103.

4

ANSWER:
5

Admit.
6
7
8
9

10

ADMISSION NO. 2: You have no signed contract or signed application for credit which
shows that the Defendant(s) applied for a credit with Chase Bank USA for alleged
account xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-3888.
ANSWER:
Admit.

12

ADMISSION NO. 3: You have no signed contract or signed application for credit which
shows that the Defendant(s) applied for a credit with Chase Bank USA for alleged
account xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-5766.

13

ANSWER:

11

14
15
16

Deny.

ADMISSION NO. 4: You have no signed contract or signed application for credit
showing th at these alleged accounts xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103, xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-3888, xxxxxxxx-xxxx- 5766 was actually established by in the Defendant(s).

17

ANSWER:
18

Deny.
19

20
21
22

ADMISSION NO. 5: You have no written contract entitled "Cardmember Agreement"
from with Chase Bank USA or such other name that states the terms and conditions
pertaining t o Chase these alleged accounts xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103, xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-3888,
xxxx-xxxx- xxxx-5766.
ANSWER:

23

Deny.
24
25
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONES TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST
FORADMISSION-2

BRAD L. WILLIAMS, P.S.
621 W Mallon A venue, Ste. 603
Spokane, WA 9920 I
(509) 456-5270

2

3
4
5
6

ADMISSION NO. 6: You have no written or signed contract with Chase Bank USA
stating what the Defendant(s) would be responsible on any charges made on the account
in connect'10n with these alleged accounts xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103, xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-3888,
xxxx-xxxx -xxxx-5766.
ANSWER

Deny.
ADMISSI ON NO. 7: You have no merchant sales receipts showing the charges that were
incurred on these alleged accounts xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103, xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-3888, xxxxxxxx-xxxx -5766 with the alleged sums in your complaint.

7
8
9

ANSWER:
Admit.

I1

ADMISSI ON NO. 8: You have no contract with Chase Bank USA assigning you to
collect these alleged accounts xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103, xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-3888, xxxx-xxxxxxxx-5766 for the above entitled case.

12

ANSWER:

10

13
14
15

16
17

18
19

20
21
22

23

Admit.

ADMISSION NO. 9: That it is true that neither Chase Bank USA or any other name it
may have, 1s not registered with the Secretary of State of Idaho to conduct business in
this state as required by Assumed Business Name Act.
ANSWER:

Deny. Plaintiff lacks the knowledge to either admit or deny the request. Therefore,
it denies th e same. Plaintiffcannot testify to the business practices of Chase Bank.
ADMISSI ON NO. 10: That EGP Investments, LLC purchased "charge-off' accounts
from Chase Bank USA or through a third party.
ANSWER:
Admit.

ADMISSI ON NO. 11: It is true that you paid for these "charge-off' accounts is
substantially less than the debts alleged to be owed to Chase Bank USA.

24
25
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONES TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST
FORADMISSION-3

BRAD L. WILLIAMS, P.S.

621 WMallonAvenue, Ste. 603
Spokane, WA 99201
(509) 456-5270

ANSWER:
2

3

Objection. Relevance. The amount paid is irrelevant to whether Plaintiff used the
credit card and has a balance due and owing. Without waiving their objection Plaintiff
will respond that it did not pay the charge-offbalance to purchase the account.

5

ADMISSION NO. 12: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does have a purchase
agreement for these "charge-off' accounts from either Chase Bank USA or through a
third party.

6

ANSWER:

4

7

Admit.

8

10

ADMISSION NO. 13: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does NOT have a purchase
agreement for these "charge-off' accounts from either Chase Bank or through a third
party.

11

ANSWER:

9

12

13
14

15
16

Deny.
ADMISSION NO. 14: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does have a collection
agreement with Chase Bank USA for alleged accounts xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103, xxxxxxxx-xxxx-3888, xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-5766.
ANSWER:
Deny.

17

19

ADMISSION NO. 15: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does NOT have a collection
agreement with Ch<:1se Bank USA for alleged accounts xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103, xxxxxxxx-xxxx-3888, xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-5766.

20

ANSWER:

18

21
22

23

Admit.
ADMISSION NO. 16: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does NOT know the "charge0 ff'' full account numbers from Chase Bank USA for any alleged accounts concerning the
Defendants.

24

25
p LAINTIFF'S RESPONES TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST
FOR ADMISSION - 4

BRAD L. WILLIAMS, P.S.
621 WMallonAvenue, Ste. 603
Spokane, WA 99201
(509) 456-5270

ANSWER:
2

Deny.

4

ADMISSION NO. 17: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does know the "charge-off'
full account numbers from Chase Bank USA for any alleged accounts concerning the
Defendant(s).

5

ANSWER:

3

6
7

8
9

10
11

Admit.
ADMISSION NO. 18: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC failed to respond to a debt
verification letter concerning any of these alleged accounts xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103, xxxxxxxx-xxxx-3888, xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-5766 pursuant to the Federal Debt Collection
Practices Act.
,ANSWER:

Deny.

12

13
14

,ADMISSION NO. 19: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC has NOT failed to respond to
a debt verification letter concerning any of these alleged accounts xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103,
xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-3888, xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-5766 pursuant to the Federal Debt Collection
Practices Act.

15
16
17

18
19

A_NSWER:

Admit.
,ADMISSION NO. 20: It is true that based upon an actual signed contract with Chase
Bank USA for alleged account xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103, you have no actual knowledge of
any provision within said contract which allows for debt transferability by sale to a third
party.

20
21
22

23

24

,ANSWER:

Objection. The Plaintiff cannot respond to the vague and ambiguous term
"contract" with Chase Bank. Plaintiff's knowledge only extends to the Cardholder
Agreement that governs the terms and conditions ofthe credit cards in question.
,.ADMISSION NO. 21: It is true that based upon an actual signed contract with Chase
Bank USA for alleged account xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-3888, you have no actual knowledge of

25
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONES TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST
FOR ADMISSION - 5

BRAD L. WILLIAMS, P.S.
621 W Mallon A venue, Ste. 603
Spokane, WA 99201
456-5270

any provision within said contract which allows for debt transferability by sale to a third
party.
2

ANSWER:

3

Objection. The Plaintiff cannot respond to the vague and ambiguous term
"contract" with Chase Bank. Plaintiff's knowledge only extends to the Cardholder
Agreement that governs the terms and conditions of the credit cards in question.

4

5
6
7
8
9

10

ADMISSION NO. 22: It is true that based upon an actual signed contract with Chase
Bank USA for alleged account xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-5766, you have no actual knowledge of
any provision within said contract which allows for debt transferability by sale to a third
party.
,ANSWER:

Objection. The Plaintiff cannot respond to the vague and ambiguous term
"contract" with Chase Bank. Plaintiff's knowledge only extends to the Cardholder
Agreement that governs the terms and conditions of the credit cards in question.

11

12
13

,ADMISSION NO. 23: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does not have ANY signed
agreements/contracts with the Defendant(s) pertaining to Chase Bank USA alleged
account xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-8103.

14
15
16
17

18
19
20

21
22

,ANSWER:

Admit.
,ADMISSION NO. 24: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does not have ANY signed
agreements/contracts with the Defendant(s) pertaining to Chase Bank USA alleged
account xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-3888.
,ANSWER:

Admit.
.,ADMISSION NO. 25: It is true that EGP Investments, LLC does not have ANY signed
agreements/contracts with the Defendant(s) pertaining to Chase Bank USA alleged
account xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-5766.

23

""ANSWER:
24

Deny.
25

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONES TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST
FOR ADMISSION - 6

BRAD L. WILLIAMS, P.S.
621 W Mallon A venue, Ste. 603
Spokane, WA 9920 I
(509) 456-5270

2
3

4

5
6

STATE OF WASHINGTON
COUNTY OF CHELAN

)
) ss
)

Brian Fair, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
That he is the Member-Manager of EGP Investments, LLC, Plaintiff in the aboveentitled action; that he has read the above and foregoing answers to Defendant's Request
for Interrogatories; that he knows the contents thereof and believes the same to be true.

7

~-

8

Brian Fair

9

10

SIGNED AND SWORN to (or affirmed) before me this
2013, by Brian Fair.

ii---

~

l).....l(ll;V'GV\
- day of-February,

11
12

13

Print Name: (kl,\,'\£. €.. b,d ll"d.- th~voo-....
NOTARY PUBLIC, state ofWashingto
My Commission Expires: 12 / { ~ /,b

14
15
16

I am an attorney for the party a~swering these discovery requests; that I have read
the discovery requests propounded to Defendants and the answers and objections, if any,
thereto, know the contents thereof and believe the same to be true.

17
18

Brad L. Williams, ISB#3976
Attorney for Plaintiff

19

20

21
22

23

24
25
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONES TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST
FOR ADMISSION - 7

BRAD L. WILLIAMS, P.S.
621 W Mallon A venue, Ste. 603
Spokane, WA 9920 I
(509) 456-5270

